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Introduction to Vol. 7, No. 2
This issue of Essays in Philosophy brings together five articles that work in the spirit of the philosophy
of history¾broadly construed. Each author provides us a glimpse into the methodological relationship
between philosophy and history.
The first paper, “Realism, Radical Constructivism, and Film History,” by Nick Redfern, grapples
well with this relationship; the author rejects realist epistemologies of “film history,” in favour of
“radical constructivism.” Realism of this sort takes the viewer of film, indeed the critically situated
“historian of film,” as having a non-interpreter role; the film historian is, following in line with
some kind of classical empiricism, merely reporting the facts. Radical constructivism is the position
that no such unmediated account is possible. The historian confronts film as she would any text or,
to borrow an idea from Charles Taylor, a text analogue. The historian interprets it, makes
judgements about it. Indeed, she is forced to make choices about what is relevant to her reporting,
and what is not. This takes an accounting of the historian’s ideas, not just the ideas represented by
the film. Not to be confused with a kind of radical historicism, the author here understands
“constructivism” as a model---a methodological ‘positioning’ or vantage from which the historian
makes her judgements. Presumably this vantage has its own expression, too, even if loosely formed
to give sense to what constitutes the model such that from it the “radical construction” can take
place. This “basic model of research into cinema” assumes a certain kind of epistemic holism that
takes as problematic those “methodological presuppositions” that favour an uncritical empiricism.
The second paper, Anders Schinkel’s “The Object of History,” cleverly dissects the ‘object’ of our
study from the ‘objectives’ our studies serve. Attending to some fine-grained distinctions in
“method,” the author attempts to provide us with “an analytical tool,” a model. The author’s paper
is animated by the ideas of Collingwood, Carr and Elton. The idea is that the historian cannot
properly ‘distinguish’ between the object of her study and her objectives in picking out the objects
she does for study. The article demonstrates the inherent difficulties in thinking of history as a
collection of facts. The best we can do, if the author is correct, is to stipulate the statuses of our
respective objects of study, their relations and, most importantly, our goals. Here, as in the first
paper, we are working within a holism, one that rejects unmediated ‘facts’ in historical
understanding.
Our third paper, “Rescuing Hempel from His World,” by Carlos Leone, is at once a historical
diagnosis, an attempt to make sense of how the philosophy of history has been set to the margin




The author suggests that the rise of the social sciences – included here is history – has set to the
margin the kind of historical sense philosophers may have had in another era (before the second
halve of the twentieth century). Inspired by Danto’s observation that an historical orientation in
philosophy finds little room on the “present scene,” the author sets out to reconstruct, in general
terms, the way the ‘character’ of philosophy and philosophizing has changed over the past fifty or
so years. The author marks an historical shift with Hempel’s radical, but certainly well discussed,
proposal in 1942 that a covering law model of historical explanation was possible; indeed, required.
The author defends Hempel, arguing for a scientifically oriented conception of person. What this
means requires some discussion, and I have confidence that the author would agree. The paper is a
rejection of interpretation and a orienting of ‘history’ around the possibility of its absorption into
scientific theory.
The fourth paper, “Mesocosmological Descriptions: An Essay in the Extensional Ontology of
History,” by Nikolay Milkov, is a fascinating defence of a “formal ontology” that relies on a
Tractarian view of objects. The author sets out an interesting strategy. First, we are reminded of the
“old argument,” (think Hempel and Popper) namely, that historical study is not different in type
from scientific investigation. The author suggests, in line with Hempel and Popper, that historical
study and scientific investigation are not different in type. Contra-Hempel and Popper, however, the
studies are different in the justificatory stories they tell. This point is not unimportant, for it
differentiates the author’s position from those who advocate for the “old argument.” So second,
with the new argument, we are promised, “an alternative scientific philosophy of historical
knowledge.” Viewing social reality as a “mesocosm,” the author sets out to demonstrate how the
individual, her geographical context and astronomic world, are related by a kind of ontological
dependence. Replacing the familiar dialectic of ‘reasons and causes,’ the author suggestively argues
for “colligation: touching, overlapping, permeating and comprising of events.” The author tells us
that the “effect of this new approach to history can be summarized as a radical widening of the
subject-matter of the discipline by opening of new layers and levels in it, thereby disclosing new
chunks of past life.” The spirit of this paper is optimistic; it regards as knowable the forces that
shaped the past.
The final paper in this issue, Constantine Sandis’ “The Explanation of Action in History,” nicely
brings together the various themes expressed by the other authors. Here, the author teases apart a
“conflation” in our talk of explanation between “the conflating view of reasons” and the “conflating
view of action explanation.” The first conflation suggests that the reasons for which one acts are
also the reasons for which for the act occurs. The second conflation suggests that an explanation of
why one acts also explains how the act occurred. The author adroitly identifies a pathology imbuing
the debate in the philosophy of history “on the relation of covering laws to historical explanation,”
namely, the combining of these two views. The central insight is that making intelligible the objects
of our explanation does not give us insight into the why an agent acts. For that we require
understanding why an agent did what she did.
The papers in this issue are an interesting contribution to studies in the philosophy of history. They
trade on a vexing tension between the agent’s knowledge of her own actions and the observer’s
getting at her reasons. Our first author suggests that we are involved in “radically constructing” and,
indeed, ‘reconstructing’ the ideas we confront in film; we are, in the end, judge and jury over what
parts of our interpretations are worthy of inclusion or which are to be excluded from our accounts.
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This is not far from the inspiration behind our second author’s paper; the historian and philosopher
are advised to remain sensitive to the recalcitrant character of our historical understanding. We are
advised to make explicit the model we are using in making sense of the past. Our final two papers
see as promising the domestication of our historical understanding into the character and form of
scientific theory. Our final paper challenges these views, and moves the debate further still. As with
much of our work in philosophy, there are no last words here. We do have some interesting
arguments to be considered and debated.
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